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Martin Luther for the Twenty-first 
Century: The Presence of the Other 
Barry G. Rasmussen 
Pastor. Rockwood Lutheran Parish 
Teulon and Inwood, Manitoba 
0 n the occasion of his retirement from teaching, a Festschrift was organized to celebrate the scholarly work of Brian Gerrish. In his response, Gerrish confesses: "The theolo-
gian in me has always been convinced that there cannot be a theology 
without a secure concept of revelation, while the historian in me whis-
pers back that revelation is in serious trouble and has been since the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."1 Behind this insecurity surround-
ing Christian revelation is the hermeneutical question of whether God 
can be present to an individual or humanity while remaining Other. Mar-
tin Luther, living before the period of time referred by Gerrish, is a theo-
logian who has stressed that God is present in human life. At the same 
time, Luther has purposely complicated the relationship between the 
sign and meaning so that God always remains Other in communication 
with humanity. In fact, this part of Luther's hermeneutic has led many to 
inquire whether Luther's writings had an active role in the creation of the 
present western secularized culture.2 This question, outside the focus of 
this paper, is one that has occupied recent Luther-scholarship and leads 
in several conflicting directions.3 At the same time, in opposition to the 
assumptions of modern western culture, it is of central importance to 
Luther whether one lives in the presence of God or not. 4 This combina-
tion, where Luther prevents revelation from becoming an expression of 
the "same" and insists that human beings live in the presence of God, 
makes Luther a theologian who is most helpful for western Christianity at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
This article will show that Luther's theology and concept of revela-
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tion, centred on the proclamation of the "Gospel, "5 is one that is able to 
talk about the presence of God in a believer's life while keeping God 
wholly Other. The relevance of this for the Christian mission at the be-
ginning of the twenty-first century will become evident by noting some 
parallels between Luther's hermeneutic and some of the concerns raised 
in recent critiques of the western metaphysics of presence. A repre-
sentative example is provided by Jacques Derrida, who also wants to 
complicate the relationship between sign and meaning for the sake of 
the otherness of the other. John D. Caputo affirms that for Derrida: 
'This delimination of reference is motivated not by subjectivism or scep-
ticism but by a kind of hypersensitivity to otherness, by a profound vigi-
lance about the other of language and of the possibility of something 
different, something 'impossible. '"6 
Luther's "hermeneutic of suspicion" was directed against any expres-
sion of transcendence used to give ultimate meaning to human accom-
plishments, works, and morality in the face of the darkness and threat of 
the future, human guilt, and the limits of the will. Luther makes it clear 
that, when faced with the God of the proclamation of the "Gospel," there 
is no secure place from where the interpreter can interpret the signs of 
God's presence and activity.7 Luther disallows the use of reason, moral 
projects, being, the human will, and even holiness as categories by which 
human beings might construct a hermeneutic to unify human experi-
ence.8 In the "Gospel," the various attempts to create identity, right-
eousness, and "eternity" are replaced with the "Other," Jesus Christ. 
Robert W Jenson claims that western civilization has heard the "Gos-
pel's" attack on idolatry without believing in Christ's gifts and so now 
faces nothingness. 9 In the aftermath of this intellectual and moral attack 
on transcendence, theology has changed so that it often becomes an 
expression of anthropology. Faith has no object but rather is urged be-
cause it is variously valued to be good for healthy, moral, or confident 
living. 10 David S. Yeago writes: "This has, moreover, been true for 'lib-
eral' and 'conservative' Protestants alike. Protestants have tended to as-
sume that the real object of faith is the fact of our being forgiven and 
accepted, rather than Jesus Christ himself, apprehended as true God 
and true human being. "11 In this nihilistic vacuum, there has arisen a 
fascination with language as a possible replacement of the gods of the 
West. 12 The ground for interpretive security is sought in humanity's abil-
ity to communicate with the other. However, since the holocaust, there 
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has been a loss in confidence that the great narratives of the last two 
centuries might be able to provide a moral basis for society. 13 An aware-
ness has arisen that instead of revealing, language is a tool for hiding. 14 
Elie Wiesel eloquently captures this loss of confidence: 
Today it's different....Like the Shekinah, Divine Presence, language has 
followed Israel into exile. What does exiled language mean? It refers to 
the distance between words and what they mask ... .In every modern 
country one witnesses this verbal inflation, and a resulting devaluation of 
words. Political parties "war" with each other, industrial enterprises 
launch "offensives," ... On another plane, Stalin built the Gulag to "re-
educate" his citizens and Lavrenty Beria (Soviet Intelligence chief during 
Stalin's regime) annihilated hundreds of thousands of people for the 
"salvation" of humanity; as for Hitler, he invented the terms 
"concentration camp" and "final solution," and all for the "well-being" of 
the human race. 15 
According to Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard, this postmodern rebellion against 
language has also occurred at other times in western civilization. 16 Luther 
is also one who had practiced such a rebellion in his context and be-
cause of that, Luther's hermeneutic is one that can prove helpful to Chris-
tian theology today. 17 
God's Speaking 
In the cross and resurrection of Christ, God actively and effectively 
speaks to create believers. God's Word in Christ Jesus is a performative 
Word that effects what it says. Thus, as God's speaking created the 
heavens and the earth, God's Word of Absolution effects absolution. 
Luther insists: 
In Holy Scripture, however, there are real blessings. They state facts and 
are effective. They actually bestow and bring what the words say. We 
also have blessings of this kind in the New Testament through Christ's 
priesthood, which is our blessing when I say: "Receive the absolution of 
your sins." ... All these things have the power to grant you forgiveness 
immediately and truly if you believe, for they are not our works; they are 
God's works through our ministry. Accordingly, they are not blessings 
that express wishes; they are blessings that have the power to bestow. 
When I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the 
Holy Spirit, it is just as if I were saying: "I am snatching you from the 
hands of the devil and bringing you to God, and I am doing this truly and 
in fact." 18 
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Luther talks about the proclamation of the cross of Christ in a way that is 
a critique of reason, human experience, and all"what's in it for me" cal-
culating philosophies. 19 Luther claims that all attempts at finding God 
by interpreting the signs through reason and experience will actually re-
sult in an increase in sin. For Luther, these interpretive strategies will be 
governed by the desires and wishes of a self-centred interpreter who now 
identifies these desires with God. Luther was convinced that such self-
created gods will eventually violently turn on the interpreter by creating a 
despair manifested as hypocrisy, self-righteousness, or self-hatred. This 
violence will be also manifested outwardly in one's relationships with oth-
ers. God's speaking gives blessings and are not a reflection of human 
wishes. 
At the end of the twentieth century, there has been a different kind of 
revolt going on against some of these same assumptions. For instance, 
Emmanuel Levinas distinguishes between what he calls the "Said" and 
the "Saying" so that the active address of and to the Other can never be 
made into a function of the Same. 20 The Said, which turns everything 
into part of the Same, is what can be said about the Other or can be the 
discourse which defines the Other by giving the parameters of what is 
reasonable or consistent with experience. Similarly, Jacques Derrida has 
recognized the inherent violence of a hermeneutic which either defines 
oneself by the other or the other by oneself. 21 John D. Caputo claims 
that there is a positive relationship between Levinas' distinction between 
the Said and the Saying and Derrida's negative theology. 22 For Derrida, 
there is a world of difference between speaking to someone and speak-
ing about someone.23 This becomes clear in his analysis of Nietzsche's 
statement: 
"Friends, there are no friends!" cried the dying sage; 
"Enemies, there is no enemy" shouts the living fool that I am. 24 
This pithy quotation, reveals the difference between talking to friends 
and enemies and talking about them. When talking about them, they 
are no longer there: "One speaks of them only in their absence, and 
concerning their absence. "25 This is true even when such friends and 
enemies are physically present. 
For Luther, what can be said about God in theology must never be 
confused with what God actively and creatively says to us in the procla-
mation of the "Gospel." Otherwise, theology becomes a new "Law." 
Violence is done to God and others as one's own agendas for salvation 
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are projected onto God. God and one's neighbour are ordered into a 
scheme for establishing one's own righteousness, identity, and salva-
tion. Talking about God does not effect salvation and righteousness. 
Theology is a second-order discourse and should not be confused with 
the encounter with God in the proclamation of the crucified and risen 
Christ. Luther safeguards against the expressions of such a tradition of 
immanence by talking about Christ as the Word spoken by God outside 
us (extra nos). The righteousness that Christ gives is always an "alien" 
righteousness (iustitia Christi aliena). Luther insists that a believer is 
simultaneously righteous and sinful (simul iustus et peccator) precisely 
because Christians encounter a Christ who is "alien" to them.26 When 
one is drawn to trust in the Other who is Christ, such a believer is com-
pletely holy, righteous, and blessed because of Christ. At the same time, 
when the same person is examined for signs of righteousness according 
to a list of categories designed to measure attributes or behaviour, one 
will either find nothing "good" or find a righteousness, which by defini-
tion, is a self-righteousness. The presence of the "alien" Christ cannot 
be understood in such a way that Christ becomes "possessed" by the 
believer. Christ remains other even while making the believer blessed by 
his presence. Luther's hermeneutic, by insisting that Christ's righteous-
ness remains "alien" and that the Word is spoken extra nos, is a radical 
critique of such a philosophy of immanence.27 
Alterity 
Luther, after introducing a distinction between a general and particu-
lar knowledge of God, shows why these two should not be confused. He 
is convinced that just about everybody has a general knowledge of God 
which includes the affirmations that God exists, that God created the 
world, and that God is good. Luther, however, is also persuaded that 
such general knowledge of God has limited or no value. The reason for 
this lies in the awareness that an intricate knowledge of God and the 
world does not reveal anything about God's intentions for us: "For it is 
written (Romans 3:11): 'No one understands God'; and elsewhere (John 
1: 18): 'No one has ever seen God,' that is, no one knows what the will of 
God is. Now what good does it do you to know that God exists if you do 
not know what His will is toward you?"28 God is not available or "at hand" 
for the "grasping" of human knowledge. It is God who ensures that no 
towers of Babel can be built to reach heaven gloriously. In fact, Luther 
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makes "the startling claim that the trinitarian God is 'hidden' precisely in 
his revelation, that God's hiddenness is a wilful act within the economy 
of salvation. "29 As part of the revelation itself, God actively hides from 
humanity so that God can communicate a particular knowledge of God 
in Christ Jesus. Luther identifies this particular knowledge as one that is 
passive: "As a matter of fact, our knowing is more passive than active; 
that is, it is more a matter of being known than of knowing. "30 Luther 
continues by explaining that being known by God means: "You have 
been visited by the Word; you have been granted faith and the Holy Spirit, 
by whom you have been renewed."31 
Luther's hermeneutic describes what takes place in the encounter 
with Christ in the proclamation of the "Gospel." This encounter creates 
faith and the fear of the Lord which is the beginning of knowledge and 
wisdom. Oswald Bayer has shown that there is an inherent connection 
between Luther's description of the vita passiva and his understanding 
of godly knowledge as that which is gained from sapientia experimental is 
rather than scientia.32 Being known by God in Christ Jesus is not the 
same as gaining knowledge of things "at hand." Nor can it be equated 
with knowledge of the self where consciousness or the mind becomes 
an object of inquiry. According to Luther, this passive and particular 
knowledge of Christ implies that: "you must hear Him and not master 
Him or prescribe method, goal, or measure to Him. "33 
This knowledge of Christ is one that is directed to us particularly. It is 
a passive knowledge that, nevertheless, delivers us from the terrors of 
the Law: 
" ... Thus day by day I can become stronger and surer against the terrors 
of the Law, till I finally become master of the Law and sin through full 
confidence in Thy mercy." This is the teaching of this psalm and our 
perpetual school, from which we never graduate as perfect masters, 
neither we nor the Apostles nor the Prophets. We all remain students 
here, as long as we live, we all ask to be washed thoroughly. 34 
That God is the active One in this proclamation of the "Gospel" is the 
death knell to a human reason which examines and judges experience in 
order to find salvation: 
Human reason is easily offended by the ugly shape of the cross. It 
regards as insane those who try to comfort, help, and care for others, or 
who boast about their great riches, righteousness, power, and victory 
over sin, death, and every evil, and about their happiness, salvation, and 
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eternal life - when meanwhile these same people are needy, weak, 
sorrowful, and despised, and are mistreated and killed as enemies of the 
state and of religion .... 35 
45 
The passivity of Luther's "particular" knowledge of God prevents the 
cross and the "Gospel" from becoming principles for building theories 
concerning knowledge and reality. Even a godly focus on the womb of 
Mary and the death of Jesus on the cross can become subverted into 
new "theologies of glory" when turned into the building blocks for con-
structing models for mastering history and reality. For example, Hegel's 
attempt to make the Christian proclamation of God's powerlessness on 
the cross into a principle of reality turns Luther's "theology of the cross" 
into a "theology of glory. "36 Such a project changes the proclamation of 
the cross and resurrection of Christ from being an announcement con-
cerning God's gifts to a scheme by which one can order life's moral 
undertakings. Luther's identification of the "particular knowledge" of 
God in Christ Jesus as God knowing us prevents the use of his theology 
for such expressions of immanence.37 Luther is aware that in the face of 
life's trials, temptations, and sufferings it is not enough to align our 
thoughts with some divine attribute or principle. As David S. Yea go points 
out, for Luther, Christian comfort is not a thought: 
Thus Luther can make the odd-sounding remark that when tribulation 
comes, "a comfort is necessary, not a thought." "Comfort" theologically 
considered is therefore not at all the same thing as "a subjectively 
consoling thought." On the contrary, the "comfort" of the believer is 
Christ himself .... 36 
Christ must reveal by his actual speaking to and for us and cannot be 
found by human seeking. In Luther's hermeneutic, Christ must reveal 
and is not immanently located in some aspect of human life. 
Emmanuel Levinas is one postmodern thinker who has judged west-
ern thought's "long adventure with immanence" to be "violent. "39 A symp-
tom of this violence is that it undercuts the possibility of a God who 
actively reveals from the outside. This concern resonates with Luther's 
hermeneutic. Adriaan Peperzak summarizes Levinas' revolt against west-
ern use of immanence: 
In any case, the project of Western philosophy has excluded the 
possibility of ego's transcending itself toward a God who would be 
absolutely other and irreducible to any element or to the whole of the 
universe. Under the name of God, the philosophers, as did the 
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theologians, built many idols [italics mine], as for example Logos, Esse 
ipsum, Substance, Nature, or Spirit, but a God neither known or 
preknown, nor concealed in the unconscious or preconscious memory 
of conscience, a God who must reveal in order to be accepted -such a 
God is impossible within the traditional framework. 40 
Levinas describes the encounter with the Other as an encounter with 
an infinity that cannot be reduced to an "ideal of reason," thereby be-
coming a projection of a beyond which completes the incomplete.41 To 
describe this encounter, Levinas has purposely chosen the face of the 
other as that which confronts us. Unlike a text or other work of culture 
the face resists being made into a phenomenon, symbol, or mask.42 It 
resists the narcissistic efforts of the self to get behind the sign and, ac-
cording to Levinas, the face claims responsibility from the one it con-
fronts. As Levinas states, the implication of this transcendence calling 
us to responsibility is that we are in a passive position concerning Good-
ness: "This antecedence of responsibility to freedom would signify the 
Goodness of the Good: the necessity that the Good chose me before I 
can be in a position to choose, that is, welcome its choice. "43 
Levinas chose the face to talk about the encounter with the other 
and that he did so because it best resists attempts at representation. In 
doing this, Levinas carefully avoids a hermeneutic which becomes an 
archeology to get past the face-to-face encounter. The face gives the 
transcendent a recognizable content, thereby saving human beings from 
an unlimited desire for transcendence. Such a desire would only con-
sume the one desiring.44 Luther expressed a similar concern by using 
the distinction between the "hidden" and the "revealed" God. God hides 
so that the revelation of God will always be "dressed and clothed in His 
Word and promises. "45 The encounter with God will be through Christ, 
the mask of God: 
The Gentiles speak with God outside His Word and promises, according 
to the thoughts of their own hearts; but the Prophets speak with God as 
He is clothed and revealed in His promises and Word. This God, clothed 
in such a kind appearance and, so to speak, in such a pleasant mask, 
that is to say, dressed in His promises- this God we can grasp and look 
at with joy and trust. 46 
The attempt to go past this mask is the attempt to view God "absolutely" 
and rise to heaven through one's own speculationsY According to Luther, 
this "naked God" eventually turns on us and crushes us with our own 
despair.48 At the same time, such a "naked God" causes trouble for 
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others: ·~1 misfortune begins in the name of God. "49 
The concern for the alterity of the other expressed throughout the 
writings of major postmodern thinkers is one that is also a priority with 
Luther. The difference is that Luther's hermeneutic is shaped by trinitarian 
and christological considerations. Luther's hermeneutic constantly di-
rects attention away from the self toward the God who speaks in Christ 
Jesus: 
I refuse to look at anything except this Christ. He should be such a 
treasure to me that in comparison with Him everything else is filthy. He 
should be such a light to me that when I have taken hold of Him by faith, 
I do not know whether there is such a thing as Law, sin, or 
unrighteousness in the world. 5° 
It is in this light that one can understand Luther's criticism of the scho-
lastic assertion that faith does not justify the sinner unless it is "formed 
by love."51 Luther calls faith, itself, a gift from God which precludes it 
from being immanently formed by human love for others. A faith "formed 
by love" asks: "What have I done? Where have I sinned? What have I 
deserved?"52 Instead, faith created by God looks away from the self to-
ward Jesus, asks what Jesus has done, and so draws the self out of itself. 
Created by the proclamation of the "Gospel'' which announces redemp-
tion from sin, eternal death, and the devil in Christ, faith has its gaze 
directed outside itself to Christ. 53 
The Gift of God 
Being drawn out of oneself is experienced as a violence against one's 
autonomy. Luther was not only convinced that God's speaking in the 
proclamation of Christ Jesus goes against what can be learned from 
experience but also goes against what human beings want or will for 
themselves. Thus, the creation of faith will necessarily entail experiences 
of Anfechtungen. These intense experiences of temptation and trial arise 
from the saving encounter with this Other called Jesus. Jesus interrupts 
the sinful self's attempts at establishing itself over against others. The 
encounter with Jesus Christ in the proclamation of the "Gospel" under-
mines all projects for self-creation and self-redemption while giving re-
demption in Christ. Luther's hermeneutic undermines modern confi-
dence in the human will. 
The sinful self, curved in on itself, believes that it can make choices 
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which, in its very choosing, has power redemptively to transcend itself. 
Modernity has taken the power of choice and has made it the locus of 
infinity and freedom. Friedrich Schiller philosophically examines the 
moment before a decision is made and the limitless possibilities become 
a particular reality. He defines this moment as an infinite space where 
there is human freedom and a free will which is not empty but is filled 
with the content of an aesthetic freedom. 54 In opposition, Robert Jenson 
once again claims that this metaphysic of pure possibility is a result of 
the western world hearing the promises of the Gospel while emptying 
those promises of Christ. Jenson writes: 
If the gospel, which asserts this God, is true, then this futurity is really 
there, and we must expect that when the gospel calls our attention to it, 
it will be noticed also by those of us who do not come to obey the gospel. 
To such notice, unbounded futurity must present itself as the child's 
nightmare of eternity, in which at every moment there is always yet 
another moment, so that no journey can have a goal, no pain a 
termination, no joy a resting place, into which the meaning of every 
temporal act and sequence evaporates. If infinity is not the infinity of 
God, it must be the infinity of the world, that is, nothingness .... lnsofar as 
the call of infinity has been an actual historical phenomenon in the 
West...radical faith and nihilism have repeatedly and with increasing 
urgency posited themselves as our only choices. 55 
Luther, many years before Schiller, also examined the moment of 
decision and came to radically different conclusions from those assumed 
by dominant western society. Luther is convinced that "the will cannot 
change itself and turn in a different direction. "56 One cannot get behind 
one's own will in order to change what one wants. Therefore, Luther 
describes the human will as either being raptured by God or enslaved by 
the devil. In Luther's own day, Erasmus of Rotterdam posited a neutral 
place from which the will could either move toward evil or the good. 
Luther identifies the inherent nihilism of such a theory by calling such a 
"will to nothing" a dialectical fiction. He traces this speculation back to 
Origen's theory of the soul as a neutral place between Spirit and flesh: "I, 
too, am familiar with Origen's fable about the threefold disposition of 
flesh, soul, and spirit standing in the middle and being capable of turn-
ing either way, toward the flesh or toward the spirit.. .. Paul here calls every-
thing flesh that is without the Spirit.. .. "57 For Luther, this theoretical propo-
sition of an abstract will is an attempt to storm the very gates of heaven. 58 
It attempts to be like God who creates ex nihilo: "For the power of apply-
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ing itself to salvation cannot be a merely abstract willing, unless salvation 
itself is to be called nothing. Nor again can desire and endeavour be a 
merely abstract willing, since desire must strive and endeavour in some 
direction .... "59 
Luther insists that it is the God who speaks in Christ Jesus who is the 
active one in salvation and that this Word is always spoken pro me or pro 
nobis. Referring to Galatians 3:13, where St. Paul says that Christ be-
came a curse for us (huper hanon), Luther confesses: " ... but He is a 
divine and human Person who took sin, the condemnation of the Law, 
and death upon Himself, not for Himself but for us. Therefore the whole 
emphasis is on the phrase huper hanon. "60 The "Word" is spoken to 
particular people at particular times. The "Word" is not passively avail-
able for insightful human searching or willing. That the "Word" is spoke 
pro nobis theologically ensures that God is the active party in salvation 
and gives the Christian message an existential focus and prevents it from 
becoming a theological abstraction. 
Luther's existential focus, therefore, is different from the popular ex-
istentialism of the twentieth century. For those who face an indifferent 
universe, existing in time which ends in death, there can be no meaning 
to one's decisions and actions apart from the meaning one gives to one-
self or receives from others. 61 Such an existential expression follows 
Luther's critique of the various attempts at making God abstract. How-
ever, at the same time, it does not hear the active voice of God which 
proclaims love. Identity and meaning are created by the self which "leaps" 
into this emptiness and, in so doing, creates its own meaning. 62 In op-
position to this, Luther insists that meaning, identity, and salvation are 
given by God in the Word, Jesus Christ. 
Nevertheless, the faith created by this "Word" is also a "leap" be-
cause, for Luther, God remains hidden within this proclamation. The 
"particular knowledge" of God is proclaimed under the cross. The love, 
mercy, promise, and faithfulness of God are proclaimed under its oppo-
site, namely, the crucified Son of God. This prevents love, mercy, prom-
ise, and faithfulness from becoming abstractions that become appropri-
ated by aligning one's life to these values. The "Word" spoken under the 
cross is not a divine lecture about righteousness but is God's active res-
cue mission of humanity. The "hiddenness" of God in the cross is not 
based on a division between Spirit and flesh which identifies flesh with 
material things. For Luther, God's "hiddenness" is not a statement about 
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humanity's dependence on the senses and reason. 63 Against this possi-
bility, Luther contends: ·~ctually the opposite is true. The Spirit cannot 
be with us except in material and physical things such as the Word, wa-
ter, and Christ's body and in his saints on earth. "64 God actively "hides" 
so that God can be active in the proclamation of Jesus Christ. 
In Luther's theology, the "hiddenness" of God is not a function of 
humanity's finitude, but is a result of God's active mission that curtails 
human attempts at reaching God. God, who alone is righteous, will not 
be reached by human attempts at establishing their own goodness or 
"goods." For Luther, all pretenses of righteousness are undermined by 
the "Law" that is never fulfilled or satisfied. 65 This use of the "Law" pre-
vents the neighbour from being used as a path to God. Luther's under-
standing of the positive use of God's "Law" places us firmly in the pres-
ence of the "other" who is our neighbour and the "Other" who is God. 
Such an understanding undermines the seeking of righteousness, free-
dom, and salvation through the realization of personal autonomy. 
In this sense, Luther's theological use of the "Law" mirrors the con-
cerns of the postmodern Emmanuel Levin as. Adriaan Peperzaks argues 
that Levinas' delineation of the alterity of the Other calls into question a 
freedom defined as autonomy: 
In turning to the alterity of the Other, I discover that my freedom is called 
into question; the Other's appearance reveals the injustice of my 
monopoly. If, by the shock of this encounter, the I seeking domination 
discovers itself to be unjust, this discovery is not a quality added to the 
preliminary existence of an innocent and neutral freedom but rather the 
beginning of a new way of existing and being conscious of myself and 
the world. The original state is not that of an ego enjoying its isolation 
before it would meet others; from the beginning, and without escape, 
the Same sees itself related and linked to the Other from which it 
separated, and it is unable to escape from this relationship. 66 
The Other lays claim to one's life. In fact, western culture's "long adven-
ture with immanence"is an attempt to protect itself from such claims. 
We have experienced and still fear the tyranny of the Other, whether it 
takes the form of the tyranny of the One or the Many. 67 
For Luther, the fear of the Other, whether experienced as the threat 
of God or the threat of the neighbour, will lead to a nihilistic despair apart 
from the resurrection or promise of the "Gospel." With the proclama-
tion of the "Gospel" both neighbour and God become gifts given to the 
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believer. The "Gospel" proclaims the righteousness of Christ and thus 
gives believers freedom to love the neighbour and God: 
To become circumcised, therefore, is a characteristic of slavery. But to 
love one's neighbour is a characteristic of freedom, because the former 
is done under the threat of the Law by those who are unwilling, while the 
latter is done by those who are willing out of love that flows freely and 
gladly. 68 
Luther's positive use of the "Law" is grounded on the "otherness" or 
alterity of Christ, God's "Word": 
Therefore Moses, together with Paul, necessarily drives us to Christ, 
through whom we become doers of the Law and are accounted guilty of 
no transgression. How? First, through the forgiveness of sins and the 
imputation of righteousness, on account of faith in Christ; secondly, 
through the gift and the Holy Spirit, who creates a new life and new 
impulses in us, so that we may keep the Law also in a formal sense. 
Whatever is not kept is forgiven for the sake of Christ. 69 
Oswald Bayer claims that it is the hermeneutical function of the a-
liena iustitia of Christ which places Luther's theology in sharp contrast 
with modern thought. Bayer continues by saying that the relationship of 
the "same" to the "other" is decisive and that, in this regard, Luther's 
hermeneutic mirrors Emmanuel Levinas' recent critique of modern as-
sumptions. Bayer writes: 
Damit ist der entscheidende Streitpunkt im Konflikt reformatorischer 
Theologie mit neuzeitlichem Denken bezeichnet. lndem ihn die 
Theologie ins Auge faJ3t, muJ3 sie auf ihre Weise das Verhaltnis von ison 
und heteron bestimmen, das in der philosophischen Tradition seit 
Platon im Sinne der monarchischen Vernunft gefaJ3t wurde und nun von 
Emmanuel Levinas, der gegen diese Tradition die ,Anderheit" (alterite) 
scharf betont, neu bearbeitet wird. 70 
Luther's hermeneutic, which directs theology to talk about the pres-
ence of God in the proclamation of the Crucified One, is very different 
from the metaphysics of presence of Greek philosophy. God, in the 
proclamation of the cross and resurrection of Christ, speaks to and for 
the ungodly. There is no perspective from which the "godly" might judge 
that God is here or there. An analogy is provided by Heisenberg's uncer-
tainty principle in physics. The theory suggests that there is no place by 
which one can judge the position and velocity of particles. Similarly, there 
is no neutral place from which one can view and determine God's pres-
52 Consensus 
ence either. 71 It does not help to affirm that God is everywhere because, 
according to Luther, that is simultaneously to say that God is also no-
where:72 " ... you will run back and forth throughout all creation, groping 
here and groping there yet never finding, even though it is actually there; 
for it is not there for you. "73 According to Luther: "There is a difference 
between [God's] being present and your touching. "74 Instead, God speaks 
a saving Word to the ungodly. Theological statements that say "there it 
is" return to Aristotelian logic. Instead, for Luther, theology functions to 
"drive" the church back into the wilderness where the "Gospel" is pro-
claimed with tears, passion, and suffering. 75 In that "Gospel" God speaks 
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glory, but in our day it is urgent to fight against making the cross into a 
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See WA 23,150, 17ff. 
WA 23, 150,22-24; LW 37,69: " ... sonst soltu wol aile Creatur, durch und 
durch lauffen, hie tappen und da tappen und dennoch nymmer mehr nicht 
find en, ob sie gleich da ist warhafftig, Denn sie ist dir nicht da." In Luther's 
exposition of Jonah, he notes that reason cannot find God either. Reason 
plays "blindman bluff' with God and: "consistently gropes in the dark and 
misses the mark. It calls that God which is not God and fails to call Him God 
who really is God." LW 19,55 (WA 19,207,3-6). 
WA 23, 150,3; LW 37,68: "Es ist ein unterscheid unter seiner gegenwertikeit 
und deinem greiffen." 
The language chosen here reflects the Gospel of Mark which tells of the Spirit 
"driving" Jesus into the wilderness. The word chosen, ekballei, is a 
particularly strong word which communicates that this was against Jesus' 
will. 
